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Search Site. Benefits Our Story. Reviews Social. Go to My Account Log Out. Phone Number. This is obviously because the tensions in the relations between the two countries have been escalating. The frontline troops are getting closer and closer, and the US has had real worries of accidental and serious confrontation between the two militaries and even accidental discharge of fires. The risk of a China-US military confrontation has increased. The reason is that the two countries' strategic hostility has continued to increase, and their mutual trust has dropped to almost zero.

Metaphorically, if the wind blows the door shut now, both countries would believe that the other side is slamming the door. If an incident like the in-flight collision in the South China Sea happens again today, it is difficult for the two sides to cool the incident down and resolve it peacefully. Who is to blame for such an awkward situation? China has absolutely no way to retreat. The one-China principle is the fundamental principle that we must insist on.

When the Democratic Progressive Party authority wants to promote "Taiwan independence," how can we not stop it? If the US really doesn't want conflicts with the Chinese mainland in the Taiwan Straits, there are two ways. First, it should put pressure on the DPP authority, not allowing it to make trouble. Today, a common expectation is that China may so dominate the discussion that the code may well have provisions supported by China barring military activities by the United States.

For its part, the United States struggles for relevance in contemporary regional discourse. US policy making is seen in Southeast Asia as devoting only episodic attention to the area. Serious US internal problems depict a nation poorly positioned to lead abroad. Among specific shortcomings, US domestic preoccupations slow the often halting pace of congressional approval of delayed administration appointments for ambassadors throughout Southeast Asia and senior State department and other policy makers.

As a result, it remains unlikely that the Biden government will join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership CPTTP which Beijing now seeks to join, even though US membership of this trade pact would provide an economic programme attractive to the region and competitive with China.

Against this background, recent US efforts to increase attention to Southeast Asia in order to counter Chinese challenges remain unattractive to Southeast Asian states seeking Chinese blandishments and wary of provoking Chinese punishment. Most regional states and commentary ignore the benefits for Southeast Asia provided by the US, including extensive investment noted above and foreign assistance — both much larger than comparable Chinese efforts.

But this high point was overshadowed by global controversy over the panic and distress seen during the concurrent US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Yet, Southeast Asian governments reacted warily with only The Philippines openly supporting, Malaysia and Indonesia publicly criticising, and Vietnam and Singapore being ambivalent.

The coup in Myanmar in February and resulting widespread civil turmoil and significant armed resistance on balance worked against US competition with China. Consistent with congressional preferences, the Biden government emphasised sanctions against abusive military leaders in Myanmar. How far even Vietnam, the country with the most to lose if China dominates Southeast Asia, will go to avoid offending China seemed evident when Hanoi allowed the Chinese ambassador to publicly meet the Vietnamese prime minister with a donation of vaccines, upstaging Harris who hours later began her visit and offered vaccines.

For now, the Biden administration seems determined to continue advancing relations with Southeast Asia in areas those governments believe will not seriously upset Beijing.

This view holds that outside countries capable of expanding and deepening their economic relationships in Southeast Asia will write the rules and set the standards for future development, trade, and investment. However, in this time of acute US preoccupation with critically important domestic issues and blowback from the Afghanistan withdrawal, it is more likely that the Biden administration will focus on working with willing partners to counter Chinese challenges, notably the Quad powers.